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EXPERIENCE:  BIAS  AND  IMPARTIALITY  OF  JUDGES
AND  JURORS
MARTHA  MINOW*
In  phase  one  of the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  hearings  on
the nomination  of Claren'ce  Thomas to serve as Associate Justice
of the United States  Supreme  Court, Thomas  testified  that  as  a
judge,  "'You  want to be stripped down like a runner,"  and "shed
the baggage of ideology.'  "I One observer commented that Thomas
"painted a vivid image of a man methodically ridding himself not
only of old ideas  and even the desire to form new  ones, but also
of traits and  attitudes  that have formed  the essence  of his adult
personality." 2  At  the  same  time,  his  supporters  argued  that  a
man  "who  has  experienced  and  overcome  poverty  and  racial
discrimination  in  his  own  life  brings  an  important  and  perhaps
irreplaceable  perspective to the court."3 Beginning with his open-
ing presentation,  Thomas  presented  himself  as  someone  unbur-
dened by a political perspective,  yet enriched by  his experiences
of poverty  and  racial  discrimination  and  therefore  attentive  to
the  concerns  of disadvantaged  people.4
After  the  second  phase  of  committee  hearings  following  the
leak of Anita Hill's charges that Thomas  sexually harassed  her-
*  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  University.  A.B.,  University  of Michigan,  1975;  M.  Ed.,
Harvard  University,  1976;  J.D.,  Yale  Law  School,  1979.  A  version  of this  Essay  was
delivered  as the  James  Gould  Cutler  Lecture  at the  Marshal-Wythe  School  of  Law  at
the  College  of  William  and  Mary  on  October  21,  1991.  A further  discussion  of related
issues appears  in Martha Minow, Equalities,  88 J.  PHiL. 633 (1991).  The author would like
to  thank  Betsy  Fishman,  Marjorie  Sheldon,  and  the  editors  of  the  William and Mary
Law Review  for their  fine  assistance.  Thanks  also  to Joe  Singer,  Elena  Kagan,  Frank
Michelman, Avi  Soifer,  and Elizabeth  V. Spelman.
1.  Linda  Greenhouse,  The  Thomas Hearings: In  Trying  to  Clarify What He Is  Not,
Thomas Opens Question of What He Is,  N.Y. TmIEs,  Sept. 13,  1991,  at A19  (quoting Judge
Clarence  Thomas).  At  another  point,  responding  to  a  question  from  Senator  Dennis
DeConcini,  Thomas  said,
I think  it's  important  for  judges  not  to have ...  baggage.  I think..,  it  is
important  for us ...  to eliminate  agendas,  to eliminate ideologies.  And  when
one  becomes  a  judge ...  you  start  putting the  speeches  away.  You  start
putting  the  policy  statements  away.  You  begin  to  decline  forming opinions
in important  areas  that could  come  before  your  court  because  you  want  to
be stripped  down like  a runner.
David  Broder,  Thomas Backs Democrats into a Corner,  CHI.  TRIB.,  Sept. 15,  1991,  at 3.
2.  Greenhouse,  supra note  1, at A19.
3.  Broder,  supra note  1,  at 3.
4.  Greenhouse,  supra note  1,  at A19.
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the portion that Thomas  called  a "high-tech  lynching" 5-the  ten-
sion  over perspective  and impartiality  only became  compounded.
Thomas  explained  that  he  had  come  to  better  and  personally
understand  the  need for rights  for the accused. 6 He  emphasized
his  own  right to  privacy  and  demonstrated  deep  concern  about
the  operation  of racial  stereotypes.7  Yet he also  attacked  liberal
interest  groups  and  the  press,  as  wellfas  the  Senate  itself, for
staging  the  high-tech  lynching.  He  conveyed  his  disrespect  for
everyone  responsible  for the process.
Do  these  experiences  render  him  less,  or  more,  qualified  for
the position he now serves  on the United States Supreme  Court?
Will  he  be  able to  strip  himself of  his anger  toward the  Senate
when  he  reviews  questions  of  congressional  intent?  Will  he  be
able  to assure  litigants  of his  impartiality  in  sexual  harassment
cases,  in  cases  involving  freedom  of  the  press,  or  in  cases  ad-
dressing  senatorial  decisions?
These  questions  expose  intense  confusion  about bias,  imparti-
ality,  knowledge,  and  experience.  This  confusion  permeates  con-
temporary  American  legal  thought,  especially  concerning  the
selection  of judges  and  juries.  The  confusion  is  particularly  pro-
nounced  because  the  ultimate  goal  of  fairness  in  our  society
includes  notions  of representation  as well  as ideas  of neutrality.
The jury is to reflect a fair  cross-section  of the community.s  Yet
the very existence  of peremptory  challenges,  which g'e litigants
the  power  to  strike  a  certain  number  of  participants  from  the
jury  without  having  to  state  any  reason,9  creates  tension  with
the  goal of a  cross-section  in the very  process  of permitting  the
parties  some  modicum  of  control  over  what they  perceive  to  be
fair  or advantageous  at trial. The Supreme  Court has ruled that
peremptory  challenges  affecting  the composition  of both civil and
criminal juries must not intentionally  exclude participants  on the
basis  of  race  or  gender  so  as  to  undermine  the  goal  of  a  fair
cross-section  of the community.1 0
5.  137  CONG.  REC.  S14,632  (daily ed. Oct.  15, 1991)  (statement of Sen.  Byrd).
6.  See Richard  L.  Berke,  The Thomas Nominations: Thomas Backers Attack Hill, N.Y.
TIMES,  Oct.  13,  1991, at 1.
7.  Id.
8.  See Taylor  v.  Louisiana,  419  U.S.  522,  526  (1975) (noting that  the American  concept
of jury  trial  contemplates  jury  drawn  from  cross-section  of  community);  Hernandez  v.
Texas,  347 U.S.  475, 482  (1954)  (holding that conviction  by unrepresentative  jury violates
equal  protection).  Even  judicial  elections,  as  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  last  year,  are
governed  by the Voting Rights  Act.  Chisom  v. Roemer,  111  S.  Ct. 2354  (1991).
9.  Swain  v. Alabama,  380  U.S. 202,  220  (1965).
10.  See, e.g.,  Holland  v.  Illinois,  493  U.S.  474  (1990);  Batson  v. Kentucky,  476  U.S.  79
(1986).  Challenges  for cause  more  directly address  the  issue  of bias. I  focus  here  on the
use of peremptory  challenges  rather  than  challenges  for  cause  in  the shaping of juries.
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My  goal in  this  Essay  is  to consider  three contrasting  views
of bias  and their relationships to the ideal  of fair  representation
in the  selection  of juries  and  judges.  As  a  nation,  we  seem  to
want  those  who  sit  in  judgment  to  have  no  axes  to  grind,  no
prejudgments  about the people  or issues they confront.  We  also
want  them  to  have  the  ability  to  empathize  with  others,  to
evaluate  credibility, to know what  is  fair  in  this world, not in a
laboratory.  And  we  want  jurors  and  judges  to  have,  and  to
remember,  experiences that enable their empathy  and evaluative
judgments. This  ambivalence,  I will suggest, reflects  a misunder-
standing  of  the preconditions  for impartiality  and  of the role  of
fair  representation  in  producing  impartial  jurors  and  panels  of
judges.  Common  sense,  case  law,  fiction,  and  even  movies  illu-
minate these  questions.
I.  Do  WE  KNOW  BIAS  WHEN  WE  SEE IT?
First,  let  me  ask  whether  we  know  bias  when  we  see  it.
Consider  the  cartoon  depicting  a  judge  with  a  large  nose  and
mustache,  looking down from  the bench at a  defendant  with the
same  nose  and  mustache.  The  judge  declares:  "Obviously,  not
guilty.""  This  cartoon  illustrates  the  usual  meaning  of  bias.  It
refers  to  an  inclination,  a  predilection,  that  interferes  with  im-
partiality. A potential juror poses the danger of bias when  he or
she is too  close  to the parties  or the issue at hand.  By  knowing
the people  involved,  by having  a direct stake  in the proceeding,
or  by  having  had  a  very  similar  kind  of  experience  as  the  one
under  scrutiny,  the  potential  juror  may  lack  or  appear  to  lack
the distance  necessary  to judge fairly.
Normally,  we think  that  a person  is or  appears  to  be  biased
toward friends, family members, or business associates. This view
reflects  a sharp departure  from the early conception  of a jury as
a  group  of people  from  a community  who knew  the parties  and
who could serve as witnesses to give evidence about the dispute.12
It  is  one  of those  curious  historical  transformations-much  like
the  transformation  of  the  term  "jury  of  one's  peers"  from  a
reference  to  nobles  to  a  reference  to  random  cross-sections  of
society.  The  jury  for  Oliver  North  excluded  anyone  who  had
11.  Charles  Barsotti, NEW  YORKER,  Nov.  21,  1988,  at  55.
12.  VALERIE  P. HANS  & NEIL  VIDMAR,  JUDGING  THE  JURY  23-24  (1986).
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followed  or even  heard about his testimony  in the  congressional
Iran-Contra  hearings.l  The jury  included  thus  only  members  of
that  odd group  of people who were  able to sequester  themselves
from a major topic  of broad public  interest and  discussion.
To  be  fair, this notion  of removal  reflects the  desire to guard
against  prejudice-to  avoid  those  who  prejudge  the  issues  at
hand. A  juror  who  has been  exposed  to  pretrial publicity  might
have or seem to have a view about the merits  of the case  or the
virtues  and  vices  of one  or more  parties.  The  question  remains,
however:  how  is  bias  to be  tested?  A majority  of  the  Supreme
Court  has  recently  ruled  that  the  issue  of  bias  in  the  face  of
pretrial publicity  is avoided when  the jurors report to the court
that  they think  they  can  be  fair.14 The jurors'  subjective  reflec-
tions may be  one  component  of any  proper impartiality  inquiry,
but  I  wonder  whether  this  is  sufficient.  A  juror  may  not  fully
understand  either  the  meaning  or  the  demands  of  impartiality;
the juror  may  miscalculate  his or her  ability to put aside  knowl-
edge  that  could  prejudice  judgment.  In  addition,  the  simple
appearance  of bias  may  damage  the basic  commitment  to a  fair
trial process.
Variations on such questions of evidence  and proof abound. For
example,  who has the burden of showing that a prospective  juror
is  actually  prejudiced?  In  a  homicide  case,  one  juror  attended
church  with  the  mother  of  the  decedent  but  was  nonetheless
allowed to serve  on the jury.15 A Supreme Court majority refused
to grant certiorari  in the case  despite Justice  Marshall's  dissent-
ing  view  that  the  defendant  ought  not  to  bear  the  burden  of
showing  actual  prejudice  when  the  probability  of  bias  was  so
great.'
6
Aside  from  such  questions  of  proof,  the  first  notion  of  bias
begins to emerge  with some clarity. A juror may be or may seem
biased  because  of personal  experience  with  the parties  or expo-
sure to publicity about their  conduct. That juror seems  too close
to the  matter at hand to render  a fair  and objective  judgment.
Does this mean that no bias arises if the juror is in the opposite
situation?  What  if the juror  is extremely  far  from the matter at
13.  North Jury Selection Bogs Down: Public  Familiarity  with Him Poses Problem, Judge
Says, L.A.  TIMES,  Jan. 31,  1989,  at 1.
Thomas felt  compelled  to state that he had never discussed  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113
(1973),  with  anyone.  See The  Thomas Hearings: Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on  the
Thomas Nomination, N.Y.  TIMES,  Sept.  12, 1991,  at A20.
14.  Mu'Min  v. Virginia,  111  S.  Ct. 1899,  1908  (1991).
15.  Porter v. Illinois,  479  U.S. 898  (1986).
16.  Id. at  901  (Marshall, J., dissenting  from denial  of certiorari).
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hand in either personal  experience  or knowledge?  Professor  Lon
Fuller  once  discussed  the  danger  that  jurors  called  to  judge  a
sailor charged  with threatening  another with bodily harm  would
not understand  the mores  of the waterfront  and would  attribute
too  much  to testimony  that the  defendant  had  said  in  the  past
that  he  would  "'stick  a  knife  in  [someone's]  guts  and  turn  it
around  three  times.'  ",17  Is  it  possible  to  risk actual  bias,  or its
appearance, by having a total absence of experience or knowledge
of the issue  or  evidence  at hand?  To  be  able  to  evaluate  state-
ments  of  witnesses,  a  jury  needs  sufficient  knowledge  of  the
witnesses'  worlds to place their statements in context. Moreover,
to be able  to render  judgment, jurors  need  sufficient  knowledge
of the  life  experiences  of those  before  them  to  make  sense  of
testimony  and  motivations.  Even  when  women  were  excluded
from  jury  service,  for  example,  Anglo-American  tradition  pro-
vided  for the use  of midwife  juries  on occasions  in which  knowl-
edge  of  pregnancy  or  childbirth  would  be  critical  to  a  reliable
judgment.18  Perhaps  that practice  also  reflected  some  delicacy  of
feeling about  whose  ears  should  hear such intimate  female  mat-
ters;  perhaps the practice  embodied  a notion of expertise  rather
than impartiality. 19
Certainly  arguments  for  the inclusion  of  women  and  African-
Americans  on juries have long encompassed the view that female
and  African-American  litigants  deserved the  chance  to  be  eval-
uated  by those  with  shared  experiences.2 0  Some  commonality  is
necessary  to know  enough  to judge.  Admittedly,  this  argument
blends  into  the  notion  of  a  fair  cross-section  of  the  community
regarded  as an independently  important  concern  about  the jury.
Both  the  appearance  of fairness  and  the fact  of  equality  in the
jury selection process matter even apart  from issues about what
knowledge  is  necessary  to judge  fairly. But the  Supreme  Court
has  acknowledged  that  impartiality  is  served  by  juries  that
17.  Lon  L. Fuller,  The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92  HARV.  L.  REV.  353,  391
(1978).
18.  See LLOYD  E. MOORE,  THE  JURY: TOOL  OF  KINGS,  PALLADIUM  OF  LIBERTY  128-29  (2d
ed.  1988).
19.  Cf.  Judith  Resnik,  On  the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations  for
Our Judges, 61  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1877,  1912  n.121  (1988) (proferring  differences  between
male and female judgments as explanation  of exclusion  and inclusion of women on juries).
20.  See Douglas  Colbert,  Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth  Amendment  as a Prohi-
bition Against the Racial Use  of Peremptory Challenges, 76  CORNELL  L.  REV.  1, 6  (1990);
Carol  Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror,  9 HARV.  WOMEN'S  L.J.  59,  80 (1986).
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represent  a  fair  cross-section  of  the  larger  society.21  Although
the  distribution  of knowledge  and  experience  may  not be  equal,
the  collective  deliberation  process  by  a jury that is a  fair cross-
section  will temper  the dangers  of ignorance.22
A confluence  of the goals of fair representation and impartiality
thus  exists.  Both  include  a  basic  idea  about  the  distribution  of
experiences  necessary  to  render  fair  judgments.  The  Clarence
Thomas  of  September  who  sought  to establish  his  impartiality,
therefore,  announced  that  he  would  retain  his  experiences  of
poverty  and  racial  discrimination  and  his  "'underlying  concerns
and  feelings  about  people  being  left  out,  about  our  society  not
addressing  all  the  problems  of  people.'  "23  Only  a  year  earlier,
David  Souter  had  felt the need  to  convey  to the  Senate  and  to
the  watching  public  that despite  a  life  as  a bachelor  and loner,
he  had  women  friends2 4  and  that  once  as  a  college  adviser  he
had  even  counseled  a  young  woman  who contemplated  an  abor-
tion.2 s  Experience  and  familiarity  with  human  emotions  bring  a
judge  or juror  within the  circle  of people  entitled  and  equipped
to  judge  others.  More  particularly,  both  Thomas  and  Souter
sought to establish that they had experiences  with points of view
not well represented at the high court. This reflects  an admission
that the  Court's  impartiality  is threatened  if it  appears,  because
of its  own narrow  membership,  to lack  an  understanding  of the
broad  range  of people who  come  before  it.
A third kind of bias remains.  It  is perhaps  the most elusive  to
state,  and  it  also  may  be  controversial  to  discuss.  I  want  to
explore  it  because  I  myself  am  suspicious  of  dualities.  I  am
troubled  by the  suggestion  that bias  may arise  when  one  is  too
close  to  but not  when  one  is  too  far from  a  problem;  but I  am
equally  troubled by the  idea that these two  are  the only  dimen-
sions  that matter. Let  us  consider  another  dimension.  Although
21.  See Holland  v. Illinois,  493  U.S.  474,  480-81  (1990). But see  id.  at 495  (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing  that  the  fair  cross-section  requirement  serves  purposes  different
from  impartiality).
22.  This  goal  may  be jeopardized  by  extremely  long trials,  because  a  cross-section  of
the population  is  unlikely  to be  able  to disengage  from  other  commitments  to serve  on
a jury for such  a trial. For this reason,  among others,  some have proposed  breaking long
trials  into smaller  parts that can  be heard  by  different panels,  as  Judge Robert  Keeton
has suggested  to me  in conversation.
23.  Greenhouse,  supra,  note  1,  at A19  (quoting Judge  Clarence  Thomas).
24.  See, e.g.,  Alan  McConagha,  Souter's First Love: His Work, WASH.  TImEs,  July  26,
1990,  at A6.
25.  Ruth  Marcus  &  Michael  Isikoff,  Souter Declines Comment  on  Abortion: Nominee
Moves  to Dispel Image as Judge Lacking Compassion,  WASH.  POST,  Sept.  14,  1990,  at Al.
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someone  may  seem  unbiased  and  removed  from  a matter, he  or
she may be implicated and seem not to be because  of unexamined
assumptions  about  the  baseline  used  to  judge  neutrality  and
impartiality.
Consider a case involving a charge of sex discrimination against
a law firm. In one such  case, the defendant law firm asked Judge
Constance  Baker  Motley to recuse  herself from the case  because
she,  as  a  black  woman  who  had  once  represented  plaintiffs  in
discrimination  cases,  would  identify  with  those  who  suffer  race
or  sex  discrimination. 26  The  defendant  invoked  the  notion  that
the judge  would be too close to the case.  The defendant  assumed
that  Judge  Motley's  personal  identity  and  her  past  legal  work
deprived  her  of  impartiality.  Judge  Motley  declined  to  recuse
herself and  explained:
[I]f background  or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient  grounds  for  removal,  no  judge  on  this  court  could
hear  this  case,  or many  others,  by  virtue  of the  fact  that  all
of them were attorneys,  of a sex, often with  distinguished  law
firm  or public service  backgrounds.27
Similarly, Judge  Leon  Higginbotham  once  was  asked  to remove
himself from  a race  discrimination  case because  he is an African-
American.2  In  declining,  he  noted  that  "black  lawyers  have
litigated  in  the  federal  courts  almost  exclusively  before  white
judges,  yet  they  have  not  urged  that  white  judges  should  be
disqualified  on matters  of race  relations. '2 9
Judge  Motley  and  Judge  Higginbotham  may be understood  to
suggest  that  they  are  no  more  too  close  to  the  matter  than
judges  of  a  different  race  or  sex  might  be  too  far  from  it. Yet
they both advance  a different view of bias and impartiality.  They
mean to expose the assumption that the neutral baseline against
which to evaluate bias is the vantage point of a white male. They
mean to show that even  whites  and males  have  a vantage  point
that  can  and  should  be  evaluated  for  bias.  Departure  from  a
white male perspective, however, does not necessarily mean bias.
Judge Motley  and  Judge  Higginbotham  mean to demand  a more
particularized  showing  of bias  than  an  assertion  of sex  or race,
26.  Blank v. Sullivan  & Cromwell,  418 F. Supp.  1, 4-5  (S.D.N.Y.  1975).
27.  Id. at 4.
28.  Pennsylvania  v. Local  Union  542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155,
156-57  (EfD. Pa.  1974).
29. Id. at  177.
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and also to remind any  who need reminding that men  as well as
women  have  a  sex,  and  whites  as  well  as  blacks  have  a  race.
These  categories implicate us all. If being implicated  means bias,
then  everyone  is  biased,  and  perhaps  then  no  one  can  judge.
That  result  is  unacceptable,  but  it  helps  suggest  a  norm  of
inclusion  to  govern  who  may  serve  as  judge  or  jury. It  points
out the danger of considering an initial appearance  of bias without
probing how  others  may be  similarly but more  subtly implicated
in the issue  of bias.
Consider a problem  chosen not at random-a  case arising from
a charge  of sexual harassment.  If brought  before a woman judge
or before  women jurors some  might worry about biased  decision-
makers.  If  the  decisionmaker  herself  were  a  victim  of  sexual
harassment, some  might worry that she would be unduly inclined
to  believe and  favor the  complainant.  As polls  conducted  during
Clarence  Thomas's  Senate  hearings  demonstrate,  women  who
have been harassed  may instead  be skeptical of another  woman's
claims.30  Perhaps  the  complainant  did  not  respond  the  way the
adjudicator  did  or would have;  perhaps the  complainant  appears
disloyal  or otherwise  blameworthy in the eyes  of the adjudicator.
These  alternatives  simply  point  to  the  multiple  directions  that
bias may take, but  not to its absence. Would restricting  decision-
making  to  a  man  or  group  of  men be  any  better?  Some  people
worried that Anita Hill's charges were not taken seriously enough
by the Senate  Judiciary  Committee in part because  the Commit-
tee was composed  entirely of men who seemed not to comprehend
the  seriousness  of the  problem.31 Some  argue  that the presence
of  even  just  one  woman  Senator  would  have  made  a  difference
on  this  score.32 This  is  an  asserted  connection  between  notions
of  fair  representation  or  cross-section  and  the  impartiality  nec-
essary  to judge  the  significance  of a  charge.
But  a  different  line  of  criticism  can  be  applied  to  a  panel  of
male  adjudicators  of  sexual  harassment  claims.  Those  adjudica-
tors  might  identify  with  the  accused  and  might  worry  about
30.  Felicity  Barringer,  The  Thomas  Confirmation: Hill's Case Is Divisive to  Women,
N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  18, 1991,  at A10.
31.  See,  e.g.,  Carol Kleiman, After Senate's Thomas-Hill Debate, Two  Women Seek Entry
to Men's Club, CHI.  TRIB.,  Feb.  24,  1992,  at 5.
32.  See id. The  confidence  with which  this point is  uttered is  challenged  somewhat  by
the  position  of Senator  Nancy  Kassebaum,  who  voted  in  favor  of  confirming  Clarence
Thomas  when  the  question  reached  the  full  Senate.  Nevertheless,  unlike  some  of  her
male  colleagues,  Senator Kassebaum  also  refused  to be  "a party to an intellectual  witch
hunt  against Professor  Hill."  The Thomas Confirmation: Women in Senate Have Their Say
Before the Vote Confirming Thomas, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  16,  1991,  at A18.
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being  accused  themselves.  They  might  worry  about  false  accu-
sations  and the  difficulty  of rebutting  them.  They might  worry
about  true  accusations,  yet not  believe  them  serious  enough  to
warrant  public  sanction.  They  also  might worry  about  true  ac-
cusations  and  seek  to  show  their  ability  to  overcome  any  ap-
pearance  of bias by  coming down  hard on  the accused.
I do not mean to suggest that everyone  is equally or identically
biased.  I  do mean to suggest that commonplace  notions  of being
too  close  or  too  far  from  the  parties  or  the  problem  at  hand
inadequately  capture the issue  of bias. Instead, people's multiple
perspectives  on  a  problem  may  diverge  in  different  ways  from
the  ideal  of  impartiality.  For  that very  reason,  a  collaborative
decisionmaking  process  involving people reflecting those multiple
perspectives  exhibits  the  special  virtue  of  a  jury or  multijudge
panel  compared  with a single judge. The value  of consultation  is
enhanced  not merely  by the presence  of more than one mind but
also  by  the  presence  of more  than  one  vantage  point.3  This  is
another  way  of saying that fair  representation  and  impartiality
converge.
II.  CRITICIZING  THE  SUPREME  COURT
The Supreme  Court's  decision  last Term in Hernandez v. New
York4  provides  an occasion  to test these  comments  and  in turn,
to test the  Supreme  Court. In Hernandez, the  prosecution  tried
a case  against  a Latino  criminal defendant  and used its  peremp-
tory challenges  to exclude  jurors  who failed  to assure  the pros-
ecutor  adequately  that  they  could  defer  to  the  official  English
translation  of  any  Spanish-language  testimony.35  The  defendant
claimed  that the  resulting  jury  violated  equal  protection  guar-
antees  because  it  effectively  excluded  all  Spanish-proficient  ju-
rors. 6
The  case  sharply divided  the  Supreme  Court. 37  Four  Justices
signed the plurality  opinion  in  which  Justice  Kennedy  reasoned
33.  A  single  judge  can  try  to  engage  in  an  imaginative  dialogue  with  people  with
different  vantage  points  on  the  problem  at hand.  Cf  HANNAH  ARENDT,  BETWEEN  PAST
AND  FUTURE: SIX  EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT  220-21 (1961) (suggesting that judgment
derives  its validity  from agreement  of individuals  with various  perspectives).
34.  111  S.  Ct. 1859  (1991)  (plurality opinion).
35.  Id.  at  1864-65.  The  prosecution  also  used  its  peremptory  challenges  to  exclude
jurors with  family members  who had  been  convicted  of crimes. Id. at 1864.
36. Id. at  1866-67.
37.  Four members  of the Court signed Justice Kennedy's  plurality opinion, id. at 1864,
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that the  prosecutor  offered  explanations  for  his  challenges,  ex-
planations  sufficiently  unrelated  to race,  and that thus  no inten-
tional  discrimination  occurred.38  These  Justices  did  not  rely  on
the view that ethnicity  or language  proficiency  are unrelated  to
race. They  could  have  relied  on  the  fact that many  people  who
speak  Spanish  are  not  Latinos  and  that  many  Latinos  do  not
speak  Spanish,  but  they  did  not.39  Indeed,  Justice  Kennedy's
opinion  includes  a rather  remarkable  statement  about  the  close
relationships  between  language  and  identity  and  between  lan-
guage  and  ethnicity,  close  enough  at times  to justify  equal  pro-
tection  scrutiny  on the basis  of language  proficiency.4 0  To reject
the  defendant's  claim,  therefore,  Justice  Kennedy's  opinion  had
to  reason  that  a  prima  facie  showing  of  an  equal  protection
violation  had  been  rebutted  by  the  absence  of  proof  that  the
prosecutor  intended to exclude  based  on race.4'
The plurality argued  more specifically that the prosecutor  had
offered  a  neutral  explanation  for the peremptory  challenges:  the
Latino  jurors  raised  doubts  for  the  prosecutor  when  they  hesi-
tated before  they  answered that they  would try to defer  to the
official  English  translation  of  Spanish  testimony  at  the  trial.4 2
This  doubt,  the plurality  claimed,  was  unrelated  to race  or  eth-
nicity. Some  Latinos  would  give  no such  grounds  for doubt,  and
some  non-Latinos  would.  Thus, the  plurality  found  that the  ex-
clusions  were not based  on race.4 3
But let us examine  the exclusions  more  closely.  Why  would  it
be  legitimate  to  worry  about  a  juror  who  could  not  ignore
testimony  given  by  witnesses,  and  not therefore  need  to  defer
solely to  a court translator's  version?  Two linked  reasons  might
be  at  stake.  This  Spanish-proficient  juror  might  base  judgment
on  information  unavailable  to  other  jurors  and  this  juror  might
two members  signed  another  opinion  authored  by  Justice  O'Connor, id.  at 1873,  Justice
Stevens  wrote  a  dissent  joined  by  Justice  Marshall,  id.  at  1875,  and  Justice  Blackmun
dissented separately while indicating agreement with one part of Justice Stevens's  dissent,
id. at  1875.
38.  Id. at  1866-67.
39.  The  plurality  opinion  did  reject  the  defendant's  claim  that  a  close  correlation
between  Spanish  proficiency  and Latino identity would be sufficient  to treat  exclusion  of
Spanish-proficient  jurors as  exclusions  of Latinos.  Yet the plurality  acknowledged  that,
at least  in this  case, the exclusion  of Spanish-proficient jurors had the effect  of  excluding
virtually  all Latinos. Id. at  1867.
40.  Id. at 1868.
41.  Id. at  1868-69.
42.  I& at  1864-65.
43.  Id. at  1867.
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claim  special  knowledge  and authority  in the  course  of the jury
deliberations. Why are these worrisome instead of desirable traits
for a juror? These worries  arise  only if one supposes:
(1) that the  normal juror  would not know  Spanish;
(2) that  only  the  official  English  translation  of  Spanish  testi-
mony  should be  used  in the jury's deliberations;
(3) that people who do not speak Spanish  adequately  can fairly
judge  people  who  do; and
(4) that the  exclusion  of  Latinos  from  the jury  leaves  a jury
that can  be perceived  as fair and impartial  in a case  involving  a
Latino  defendant  (and, in this case,  Latino victims  as well).
Underscoring  these  suppositions  is Justice  Kennedy's  endorse-
ment  of the trial  court's  conclusion  that, because  Latino jurors
might  be  sympathetic  to  both  the  Latino  defendant  and  to  the
Latino  victims and  witnesses, it is not discriminatory  to exclude
Latino jurors; the sympathies  wash out.44 This view  neglects  not
only Latinos  in the community  who view  trial participation  as a
civic right but also ignores  all those troubled by the omission  of
an  entire perspective  and  knowledge  base  from the jury.  More-
over, it also wrongly  implies that  only Latinos  have  sympathies
in  cases  involving  Latinos.
Treating  only Spanish-speaking  Latinos as  a problem,  the plu-
rality  cited  a  case  "which  illustrates  the  sort of  problems  that
may arise where a juror fails  to accept the official  translation  of
foreign-language  testimony."4 5  In  United States v. Perez,46 a juror
asked  the  judge  if  it  would  be  possible  to  ask  the  translator
about  the  meaning  of  a  particular  term.  The  translator  had
interpreted  the  word  to  mean  a  public  bar  although  the  juror
thought it meant a restroom.  The judge indicated that'questions
could  be  put  only  to  the  judge,  not  to  the  interpreter.  The
interpreter  nonetheless  volunteered that jurors "are not to listen
to the  Spanish  but  to the English.  I  am  a  certified  court  inter-
preter. 47  At  this  point,  the  transcript  produced  by  the  court
reporter indicated that the juror called the translator an "idiot."48
The juror  later  explained,  however,  that  she  had  said,  "It's  an
idiom." 49 (We have several layers of interpretation problems here!)
The juror was  dismissed  from the jury.50
44.  Id. at  1871-72  (deferring to the trial  court's  finding).
45. Id. at 1867  n.3  (citing United States  v. Perez, 658  F.2d 654  (9th Cir.  1981)).
46.  658 F.2d  654.
47.  Id. at 662.
48.  Hermandez, 111  S.  Ct. at 1867.
49.  Id.
50.  Id-
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This  episode,  offered  by  Justice  Kennedy  as  evidence  of  the
sort of problems  that may  arise when a juror fails to accept the
official  translation  of  foreign-language  testimony,  may  also  indi-
cate the sorts of problems  that arise  when the trial process  fails
to accommodate  people  who  are bilingual.  The juror's  question
was  treated  as  an  intrusion  rather  than  as  an  effort  to  get  at
the  truth;  the  witness's  testimony,  she  suggested,  would  make
more  sense  if it  referred  to  a restroom  rather  than  a  bar.  The
court  interpreter  reacted  defensively,  and  the  judge  responded
by  banishing the inquiring  juror from  the trial.
This  story  contrasts  sharply  with  a  case  in  which  a  man  got
into a fight in a bar with another man  and killed him.5' Both men
were  Mexican-Americans.  The  offender  argued  that  his  victim
had  given  him  "el  ojo,"  meaning,  "the  eye. '52  At  that time,  no
Mexican-Americans  were  eligible  to  serve  on  juries  in  Texas,
where  the  incident  occurred.3  The  defendant  was  convicted  of
murder. As  one  observer  noted  about the case:
"Anglos  have  a big thing  about  eye  contact  being  something
positive. You  can take a man's  measure by making contact....
Hell,  in  the  Mexican  community  eye  contact  can  kill  you.  It
sends  the  other  guy  a  message  that  says  what  the  hell  are
you  lookin'  at,  and if  you  don't like  it, do  something about it.
In a  bar that can  lead to a killing. But if  you  don't know that
you can't relate to what it means. And unless jurors understand
the  difference  between  el  ojo and  eye  contact,  the  defendant
is not being tried  by a  jury of his  peers."
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  essentially  agreed.
In  1954, the Supreme Court-the same Court that decided Brown
v. Board of Education"  -reversed  the conviction. 56 The Court was
composed  of  Justices  quite  different  from  those  serving  on  the
present  Court. The  present  Court  has  moved  away  from recog-
nizing  language,  ethnic,  and  racial  differences  as  important  di-
mensions  of  American  life  and  dimensions  to  be  integrated
throughout  our  institutions.  Instead,  the  Court  seems  to  fear
differences  and to desire to exclude those people it fears. Because
51.  See  Hernandez  v.  State,  251  S.W.2d  531  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1952),  rev'd sub  noma.
Hernandez  v.  Texas,  347 U.S.  475  (1954).
52.  THOMAS  WEYR,  HISPANIC  U.S.A.:  BREAKING  THE  MELTING  POT 83  (1988).
53.  Hernandez, 251  S.W.2d  at 533.
54.  WEYR,  supra note 52,  at  83 (quoting Gilbert Pompa).
55.  347 U.S.  483  (1954).
56.  Hernandez  v. Texas, 347  U.S.  475  (1954).
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Spanish-speakers  soon will probably  become  a majority  in  parts
of  California  and Texas,5 7  these  exclusions  would  be  carried  out
in the name  of a minority  mistaken  about the actual  norm.
What if the Supreme' Court instead  exposed  for discussion the
assumption  that  English-speaking  and  not  bilingual  jurors  are
the  norm?  Even  in  last  year's  case,  a  majority  of the  Justices,
in  separate  opinions,  considered  ways  to  change  the  jury  to
accommodate  bilingual  jurors.  Six of the nine  Justices proposed
that jurors  proficient  in  a language  used  by  witnesses  be  given
an opportunity to indicate to the judge  any problems they detect
with  the  translations."  The  plurality  acknowledged  the  "harsh
paradox  that  one  may  become  proficient  enough  in  English  to
participate  in  trial,"  given  the  English-language  ability require-
ments for federal jury service,  "only to encounter disqualification
because  he knows  a second  language as well."59 Nevertheless,  for
these  Justices,  the  treatment  of  bilingual  jurors  remained  a
marginal  concern, largely relegated to footnotes.  The assumption
that  the  non-Spanish  speaking  juror  is  the  impartial  decision-
maker  contributed to this  failure. The  problem  of bias  for juries
and  for judges arises  not only when  they are too close  to or too
far from  those they judge but also when they  fail to identify  an
entrenched  and  biased  assumption  about  whose  perspective  is
the norm.
The  arguments  for  a  jury that  is  a  fair  cross-section  of  the
community  only  strengthen  this  critique.6 0  To  be  perceived  as
fair  by  the entire  community,  to  accord  all  citizens  a  chance  to
serve  as jurors, and to grant parties the opportunity to be  heard
by their peers, the jury should  reflect  a fair  cross-section  of the
community.  Such  a  cross-section  is more  likely  to bring to bear
knowledge  critical to evaluating evidence,  credibility, and justice
in  a  given case.
57.  See, e.g., Lily  Eng  & Bob  Schwartz,  City's Latinos on  the Grow, L.A.  TIMES,  Feb.
26,  1991,  at  B1; cf.  Product Development Needed for Growing Hispanic  Population, UPI,
July  21,  1988 (noting that one in four Texans will be Hispanic  by the year  2000), available
in  LEXIS,  Nexis  Library, UPI File.
58.  Hernandez  v. New York, 111  S.  Ct. 1859,  1868 (1991) (plurality opinion); id.  at  1877
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
59.  Id.  at  1872.
60.  Those  arguments  include  the  rights  of the  parties  to  be  evaluated  by  a jury  of
their  peers,  the  rights  of  potential  jurors  to  serve,  and  the  prerequisites  for  public
confidence  in the process of trial. See Holland v. Illinois,  493 U.S. 474, 495 (1990) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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III.  PREJUDICE  VS.  PRIOR  KNOWLEDGE
In case  I seem to have implied that bias  and prejudice  are not
problems  for  juries  and  judges,  let  me  turn  to  a  distinction
between  prejudice  and prior knowledge.  I believe that an impor-
tant distinction  does exist. Prejudice  interferes  with impartiality.
Prior knowledge may assist impartiality, however, if coupled with
a willingness  to be  surprised, rather than  always  confirmed.  Let
me offer  into evidence  a  short story by  James Baldwin,  entitled
Sonny's Blues.61
It  is  a  story  of  two  brothers,  both  African-American.  One
brother,  the  narrator,  served  in  the  Army  and  then  became  a
high  school math  teacher,  a husband,  and  a  father. His  younger
brother, Sonny, became  a heroin  addict,  a convicted  felon, and  a
jazz pianist.62 The school teacher ignored Sonny during the initial
period of Sonny's  incarceration.  But when the teacher's  daughter
dies  of  polio,  Sonny  writes  him  a  heartfelt  letter.6  They  then
stay in touch, and  when Sonny is released, they reunite. But the
teacher is wary, concerned that Sonny will continue to use drugs.
He simultaneously  feels  guilty and worries that he is not fulfilling
his mother's  last wish that he watch  out for his brother.6  Sonny
tells his brother  he knows that he may start using drugs again.65
Reluctantly,  the teacher accepts  Sonny's  invitation to join him
at a nightclub. For the first time, he hears Sonny play the piano.6 6
It  is  Sonny's  first  return  to  the  instrument  since  his  time  in
prison.  The  teacher-narrator  notes:  "All  I  know  about  music  is
that not many  people ever really hear it. And even then, on the
rare  occasions  when  something  opens  within,  and  the  music
enters, what  we mainly hear, or hear  corroborated,  are personal,
private, vanishing  evocations"  different from  what is  evoked  for
the  person  making  the  music.67  Drenched  with  his prior  knowl-
61.  James  Baldwin,  Sonny's  Blues,  in  How  WE  LIVE:  CONTEMPORARY  LIFE  IN  CONTEM-
PORARY  FICTION  747  (Penney Chapin  Hills  & L. Rust  Hills  eds., 1968).
62.  Id. at  748-50,  761-62.
63.  Id.  at  751.
64.  His  mother had  said, "'It  ain't only  the bad ones,  nor yet the dumb  ones that gets
sucked  under,'"  id.  at 756,  and then  she told him about his uncle  who  had been lynched,
id.  at  757.  She said,  "'You  got to hold  on  to  your brother  ...and  don't let him fall,  no
matter  what  it  looks  like  is  happening  to  him  and  no  matter  how  evil  you  gets  with
him.'"  Id.  at 757-58.  She  added,  "'You  may  not be  able  to stop  nothing  from  happening.
But  you  got to  let him  know you's  there."' Id.  at 758.
65.  Id. at  768.
66.  Id.  at 769.
67.  Id. at  770.
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edge  and  suspicion  of  Sonny,  and  with  feelings  of  guilt,  the
narrator  still tries to  discern  what  Sonny  feels  as he  plays.  He
begins to recognize the dialogue between  Sonny and the musician
playing the bass fiddle.  The bass player  "wanted  Sonny to leave
the shoreline  and strike out for the deep water. He was Sonny's
witness that deep water and drowning were not the same thing-
he  had  been  there,  and  he  knew."6  The  narrator  watches  his
brother  move  from  absence  to  real  presence  with  the  other
musicians  and then  join them  in  finding new  ways  to  make the
audience  listen  to  the  not-new  story  of  human  suffering. 69  The
narrator  is  brought  to  his  own  memories  but  also  to  a  new
respect for his brother, a man who chose not the norms of middle-
class respectability,  but expression  of human experience  through
the blues.
The  narrator  is  not  asked  to  judge  Sonny,  although  he  does
so. Nonetheless,  the  story suggests  the  difference  between  pre-
judging a matter, even when prejudice  is based  on actual knowl-
edge,  and  the  use  of  prior  knowledge  as  part  of  a  process  of
opening  up to the possibility  of surprise.  The story suggests  the
difference  between  mulling over personal, private evocations  and
attending  to  the  situation  of  another  person.  The  story  also
suggests  that, initially,  the  shared  past  and  experiences  of the
two  brothers  stand as a barrier to mutual understanding.  Later,
however,  the  narrator  is  able  to integrate  his  memories  of his
parents  and  his  brother  into  a  new  understanding  and  respect
for  the  path  Sonny  takes. It may  be  too  much  to  suggest  that
we  are  all  brothers  and  sisters  in  this  way,  although  such  an
attitude  need  not  interfere  with  impartiality  if  we  try  to  use
what  we know  to remain open  to surprises  about  one  another. I
have  used  this  story in teaching  judges70 and  often  asked these
questions:  "If you were  asked  to sentence  Sonny  in  a new  drug
charge,  would you want to know about the piano playing?  Would
you  want  to hear  it?  Would  you want  to include  as judges  and
juries  people  who  know  Sonny's  world  or  only  people  with  no
knowledge  of it? Is there  anyone  who is  not implicated  in it?"
Let  me  contrast  this  story  with  the  recent  movie  Thelma &
Louise. 71 Two women plan  a weekend away from the men in their
68.  Id.
69.  Id. at  771.
70.  See Martha Minow,  Words and the Door to the Land of Change:  Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43  VAND.  L.  REV.  1665,  1689-95 (1990).
71.  THELMA  & LOUISE  (MGM-Pathe  1991).
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lives, but they quickly find trouble at a honky-tonk. A man starts
dancing  with  Thelma,  then  makes  sexual  advances  toward  her.
When  she resists, he violently starts to rape her. Louise appears
with a  gun, the man  stops, but he shows  no remorse,  and Louise
kills him. The rest of the movie  follows their journey as outlaws,
trying  to  escape  legal  repercussions.  The  movie  includes  their
encounter with a truck driver who repeatedly makes gross sexual
advances  toward  them  and  their  fantasy  revenge  against  him.
The  movie  concludes  with  their  suicide  in  a  world  aiming  to
capture  and  punish  them,  a  world  they  do  not  believe  could
understand  them.
The film triggered  considerable  press. In Boston, the Globe ran
side-by-side  columns:  A  woman's  review  was  entitled, She Loves
It;
72  a  man's review:  He Hates It.73 The Boston Globe has  its  own
problems  of perspective.  A  common  prediction  about that paper
is that if a  nuclear  bomb fell  on  New  York, the  headline  in the
Boston Globe would  read: "Hub  Man Injured in Explosion."7 4  But
the  issue  of  perspective  is  unusually  pronounced  in  evaluations
of  the  movie  Thelma  &  Louise.  Some  charge  the  movie  with
stereotyping men  and giving bad role models  for women.  Others
cheer its  depiction  of women  fighting  back in  a world they  find
unsafe and inhospitable.  Perhaps only a law professor would  like
best  a  particular  line  in  the  movie.  It  is  uttered  as  the  two
women  discuss how police and  prosecutors would not understand
how  a woman  who  danced with  a man  could  establish  his sexual
advances  were  unwanted.  Thelma  says,  "Law  is  some  tricky
shit." s  That  statement summarizes  the conviction that the male-
dominated  legal system  will not understand  how  a woman  could
charge  rape after  she flirted  with a man or  how a woman  could
be  excused  or  forgiven  for  killing  a  man  after  he  had  stopped
raping  a  woman.  Perhaps  the  polarized  reviews  confirm  their
doubt.  In  a  way,  Anita  Hill's  experience  could  be  described  as
"Thelma  and  Louise Meet  the  Supreme  Court Nomination  Proc-
ess-and  Discover  How  Unsafe  and  Inhospitable  the  Senate  is
from  a Woman's  Point of View."
I  put  the  film  forward  here  for  a  different  reason.  I  wonder
whether  the  film,  like  the  story, Sonny's Blues, asks  us to  use
72.  Diane White, She Loves It,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  June  14,  1991,  at 29.
73.  John Robinson, He Hates It,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  June  14,  1991,  at  29.
74.  "Hub"  is the  Globe's  abbreviation  for Boston  as the  hub  of  the universe.  See Ask
the Globe, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Sept. 8,  1990, at  60.
75.  THELMA  &  LouISE,  supra note 71.
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what we know but to suspend  our conclusions  long enough to be
surprised, to learn.  One  of the actresses  who  starred  in  Thelma
& Louise said  that people  who  find that the film mistreats  men
are identifying  with the wrong characters. 76 She invites  all view-
ers to identify with the journey of self-discovery  and self-criticism
undertaken  by  Thelma  and  Louise.  They  know  they  have  done
something  wrong,  and  the  film- does  not  excuse  them.  But  it
invites  understanding  and  wagers  that gender  is no  obstacle  to
that.  None  of  us  can  know  anything  except  by  building  upon,
challenging,  responding  to what  we  already  have  known,  what
we  see  from  where  we stand. But  we  can insist  on seeing what
we  are used to seeing, or else  we can try to see  something  new
and  fresh.  The  latter is  the open  mind  we  hope for  from  those
who judge, but  not the  mind as  a  sieve without  prior reference
points  and  commitments.  We  want  judges  and juries  to be  ob-
jective  about the facts  and-the  questions  of guilt  and  innocence
but committed  to building  upon what  they  already  know  about
the  world,  human  beings,  and  each  person's  own  implication  in
the lives  of  others.  Pretending  not to know  risks  leaving  unex-
amined  the very assumptions that deserve  reconsideration.
IV.  PREJUDICE,  PRIOR  KNOWLEDGE,  AND  THE  SUPREME  COURT
This prompts me, once more, to consider the situation of Justice
Clarence  Thomas,  both  as  judge  and  as  someone  to  be  judged.
Three  versions of what  has  happened to  him have emerged:
(1) The  Republican  story,  put  most  cogently  by  the  nominee
himself,  of  a  high-tech  lynching,  a  process  spun  out  of  control
through the manipulations  of liberal interest groups, Senate staff
members,  and  ambitious  press people  who  conspired  to produce
a  charge  of  sexual  harassment,  delay  its  evaluation,  leak  it at
the eleventh  hour, and prompt  a circus-like  hearing besmirching
Thomas's  good name.
(2) The Democratic  story of a terrible process, but one  with no
better alternative, because the Constitution calls upon the Senate
to  advise  and  consent  to  presidential  nominations,  because  the
complainant's  demand for confidentiality delayed  consideration  of
the  charge  of  harassment,  and  because  an  unfortunate  leak  to
the  press  brought  to  public  attention  this  serious  charge  and
required  public  resolution.
76.  See Judith  Michaelson,  Doumright Serious: With  "Thelma & Louise,"  Geena Davis
Is Forging  a New Image, Closer to Her Own Reality of a Woman Who  Takes Care of Her
Life, L.A.  TmIES,  May  12,  1991,  at 5 (quoting Geena Davis).
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(3)  The  baptism-by-fire  theory,  according  to  which  we  have
witnessed a process  of intensive job training, with the result that
Clarence  Thomas  may  end  up  emphatically  defending  privacy,
and  the  rights  of the  accused.  He  criticized  racial  stereotypes
and  concluded  that his  own integrity  mattered  more than  ambi-
tion-in contrast to positions  he had  taken previously.
I  want  to  believe  the  third  story,  and  Thomas  himself  has
testified  to it.77  But he has  also indicated  his fury at the  Senate,
his  disdain  for  liberal  interest  groups  and,  it  seems,  apparent
disrespect  for  many  Democrats  and  press  people. 8  To  some
observers,  he  seems  untrustworthy  on  questions  of  sexual  har-
assment, perhaps  even  a lying perpetrator.
Will  Thomas  now  recuse  himself from  cases  of sexual  harass-
ment?  From  cases  involving  liberal  interests  groups  or  Demo-
cratic  Senators?  These  matters will remain  with  his conscience.
To be  fair, we  should  not  use  our  metaphoric  peremptory  chal-
lenges  against  him.  But  to  earn  the  respect  of  the  public,  he
must indicate  how  he will draw  on the parts of his  past that he
claimed  taught  him  about  people  left  out,  disadvantaged,  and
misunderstood.  It  would  help  if  he  worked  to  prompt  other
Justices  to make  explicit the assumptions  they take for  granted
about whose  perspective is neutral and whose  is biased. It would
help  if he  does  not strip himself down like a runner, but instead
acknowledges  his own  situation  as a brother79  implicated  in the
lives  of  others  and  able  to  be  surprised  while  he  builds  upon
what  he already  knows.
77. See Neil  A.  Lewis, The Thomas Swearing-In: After Ordeal of Senate Confirmation,
Views on Thomas's Court Opinions, N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  19,  1991,  at 8.
78. See Peter G. Gosselin,  Thomas Says He'll Fight to the End,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  Oct.  13,
1991, at 1.
79.  Thomas's  treatment  of  his sister  in  a  speech  commenting  on  her  dependency  on
Aid  to  Families  with Dependent  Children  gave  some critics  another  ground  for  attack,
because  he seemed  to register  callous  disregard  for her difficult  times, ignorance  about
the  gender  difference  that had  contributed  to their contrasting  life  stories, and  reckless-
ness  with  the  truth. See Joel  F. Handler,  The Judge and His Sister: Growing up Black,
N.Y.  TIMES,  July  23,  1991,  at A20  (letter to the Editor).
1218 [Vol.  33:1201